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In strongly protecting the rights of criminal defendants, the Founders
of the U.S. Constitution were reacting to the near absolute power of the
English Crown and Parliament, which operated without constitutional re-
straint.1 This "uncontrolable [sic] authority" 2 left a bitter taste in the
mouths of the Founders, so when they set up the federal government of the
United States, they ensured important governmental limits on the creation
of the criminal law by placing those limitations in the nation's Constitu-
tion. 3 One of these express limitations upon both the powers of the United
States and of the individual states is the prohibition on the passage of ex
post facto laws.4 While both ex post facto legislation and bills of attainder
were valid and binding in England and untouchable by the English judici-
ary,5 the U.S. Constitution banned their use in Article 16 and the federal
judiciary has built upon the constitutional prohibition by creating a clear
and definitive line of precedent governing such retroactive laws.7
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2008; B.A.,
Legal Studies, University of Illinois-Springfield, 2005. 1 owe a huge debt of gratitude to Professor
Daniel Hamilton for his time and insight, and to Jessica Fender, my Editor-in-Chief, for all of her time,
work, and effort. Special thanks to my family and friends; their endless patience and understanding is
truly a blessing.
1. WILLIAM P. WADE, A TREATISE ON THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF RETROACTIVE
LAWS, AS AFFECTED BY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS § 4 (1880).
2. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *160.
3. Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1275-77 (1998) (describing the Framers' attitude while adopting the Constitution
as an "obsessive concern over the threat of retroactively-designed laws").
4. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses: one directed at Congress (§ 9, cl. 3) and one
directed at the States (§ 10, cl. I). In fact, the principle of anti-retroactivity is found in several provi-
sions of the Constitution. For example, Article I, §§ 9-10 (forbidding bills of attainder) prohibits legis-
latures from passing any law which inflicts punishment upon a person or group of people without a
judicial trial, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits government actors from taking
private property for public use without just compensation, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the interests in fair notice that retroactive legislation may compromise.
5. WADE, supra note 1.
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 ("No... ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
7. See infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
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Although the applicability of the ex post facto prohibition to civil law
has been debated in the judicial branch, 8 its ban in the criminal arena has
been settled since the country's inception-retroactive criminal laws will
not be tolerated.9 This is because, according to one historical treatise, "it is
difficult to reconcile to our sense of justice and right, a rule which directs
its commands and prohibitions to past conduct."' 10 The Supreme Court has
carved out four categories of prohibited ex post facto laws: (1) criminaliz-
ing innocent acts after they are committed, (2) aggravating past offenses,
(3) requiring less evidence than was required for conviction of an offense
after it is committed, and (4) increasing the punishment attached to an of-
fense after it is committed." In recent years, the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines (the Guidelines) have thrust this problem of retroactively increasing
punishments into the federal courts. Specifically, the question confronting
courts is whether revisions of the Guidelines can be applied retroactively,
to cases pending in court, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause.
In its 1987 decision in Miller v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that
Florida's retroactive application of its legislatively-enacted state sentencing
guidelines, which increased punishments attached to prior-committed of-
fenses, was in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 12 Since that time,
federal circuit courts, relying on Miller and the similarly mandatory role of
the federal Guidelines, used the Ex Post Facto Clause to prohibit sentenc-
ing judges from retroactively applying their revisions as well. 13 However,
in United States v. Booker,14 a dramatic decision handed down in early
2005, the Supreme Court excised the provision of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines that made them mandatory. In an effort to cure Sixth Amend-
ment issues-specifically, judges determining sentences by making factual
findings that may not have been reflected in a jury verdict-the Supreme
8. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 267 & n.21 (1994) ("[T]he potential
unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a state its
intended scope.... In some cases, however, the interest in avoiding the adjudication of constitutional
questions will counsel against a retroactive application."). For an early version of the debate, compare
the decisions of Justices Yates and Thompson in Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 5 Am. Dec. 291
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Justice Yates found it "manifest" that the Constitution did not include civil cases
in its prohibition of ex post facto laws while Justice Thompson insisted that the retrospective applica-
tion of any "new rule of law" that "can be so construed as to do injustice" is a violation of the Ex Post
Facto Clause).
9. Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-91 (1798), serves as the
first judicial decision setting forth the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to penal legislation. The
opinions listed supra in note 8 all agreed upon the Ex Post Facto Clause's application to criminal laws.
10. WADE, supra note 1, § 3.
11. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390.
12. 482 U.S. 423,435-36 (1987).
13. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
14. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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Court changed the Guidelines' role in determining sentences from binding
to advisory.
Booker's advisory mandate and the Guidelines' apparent loss of force
in sentencing decisions led some circuits to find that the same retroactive
application of the Guidelines no longer violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.15
Ironically, Booker's attempt to remedy unconstitutional sentencing and
protect individual rights has resulted in this unintended and different, yet
equally disturbing, breed of constitutional conflicts. While these dramatic
shifts in constitutional precedent have passed under the legal radar rela-
tively unnoticed, they are no less threatening to our nation's commitment to
a limited government and protection of individual liberties than those ac-
tions found unconstitutional in Booker.
The following scenario will help illustrate this extreme change in
precedent. Defendant A commits wire fraud in December of 1995. At the
time of the crime, the 1995 Guidelines Manual directs a sentence in the
range of eighteen to twenty-four months. By the time Defendant A is sen-
tenced, the 1996 Guidelines Manual is in effect and directs an increased
sentencing range of between twenty-seven and thirty-three months. Any
federal circuit court at that time would have reversed a retroactive applica-
tion of the increased sentencing range to Defendant A as a violation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause. 16 The Supreme Court hands down the Booker opin-
ion in 2005, directing courts to consider the Guidelines in addition to other
statutory factors. Defendant B commits bank fraud in December of 2005.
At the time of the crime, the 2005 Guidelines Manual directed a sentence
of eighteen to twenty-four months. By the time Defendant B is sentenced,
the 2006 Guidelines Manual is in effect and directs an increased sentence
of between twenty-seven and thirty-three months. After Booker, some cir-
cuits are now affirming the same retroactive applications of the increased
sentencing ranges that they reversed prior to Booker. 17
Applying revisions of the Guidelines to defendants who committed
their crimes prior to the effective date of those revisions remains retroactive
and substantially disadvantages such defendants. Moreover, the national
trend since Booker indicates that the Guidelines continue to have the "force
15. E.g., United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Barton,
455 F.3d 649, 652-56 (6th Cir. 2006).
16. See infra note 70 for a circuit-by-circuit list of cases finding the retroactive application of the
Guidelines in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
17. Compare Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (retroactive application no longer violates Ex Post Facto
Clause), and Barton, 455 F.3d 649 (retroactive application no longer violates Ex Post Facto Clause),
with United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1385-86 (7th Cir. 1994) (retroactive application violates
Ex Post Facto Clause) and United States v. Nagi, 947 F.2d 211, 213 n.l (6th Cir. 1991) (retroactive
application violates Ex Post Facto Clause).
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and effect of law," create "high hurdles" for judicial discretion, and can
"directly and adversely affect the sentence" a defendant receives.18 There-
fore, despite these early precedents, federal courts need to continue apply-
ing the Ex Post Facto Clause to the revisions of the now-advisory
Guidelines.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Guidelines and the
precedent regarding the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to those
Guidelines. Part II outlines the Supreme Court's opinion in Booker and
examines the effect the decision has had on sentencing practices. Next, Part
III illustrates how the advisory Guidelines still fall within ex post facto
doctrine, specifically applying pre-Booker rationale to post-Booker prac-
tices. Finally, Part IV argues that regardless of the level of deference or
weight circuit courts choose to accord the Guidelines after Booker, the Ex
Post Facto Clause continues to bar the retroactive application of Guidelines
revisions.
I. HISTORY
The structure of the United States government has become much more
complex since the Framers originally drafted the U.S. Constitution. 19 For
example, the legislative branch has created a wide array of agencies and
commissions within the three branches, such as the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency under the executive branch and the Federal Judicial Center
under the judicial branch. Due to the immense increase of federal oversight
and regulation since the founding, the legislature has found it necessary to
delegate parts of its authority and oversight power to these agencies. 20 As a
result, language which was unambiguous to the drafters when originally
18. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435 (1987).
19. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 95-127 (2000)
(describing the emergence of agency government and the complications arising from administrative
law). White traces the evolution of the changing concept of the Constitution-an evolution that allowed
for its increasing complexity and the emergence of agency government.
Prior to the twentieth century, the Constitution was generally seen as the embodiment of uni-
versal, fixed principles... [that] were not designed to change with time or events.... In the
early twentieth century this traditional conceptualization of the Constitution was challenged
by the view that the Constitution was a "living" document, one capable of responding to
changing conditions.
Thomas G. Walker, G. Edward White's The Constitution and the New Deal, II LAW & POLITICS BOOK
REV. 128, 129 (2001).
20. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) ("Delegation by Congress
has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a
futility.") (citing Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15 (1939)); Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361,
372 (1989) ("[l]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.").
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included in the Constitution, such as "law," is now ambiguous and subject
to debate under the new governmental structure.2 1 In particular, the prohi-
bition of ex post facto "laws" included in Article I was clearly aimed at
Congress, the sole legislative branch of the federal government. But with
the advent of rulemaking and quasi-legislative functions in these inferior
agencies, what really constitutes a "law" is not as clear. Subpart A below
will discuss the establishment of the current sentencing scheme created by
Congress, including the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the Sentencing
Guidelines promulgated by that agency. Subpart B will outline the history
of ex post facto jurisprudence leading up to, and including, present day
doctrine, and then will summarize the courts' treatment of the Sentencing
Commission and the Guidelines under that jurisprudence.
A. Overview of Federal Sentencing Guidelines
When the federal court system was established, and for over two cen-
turies after, judges were entrusted with wide discretion in sentencing, al-
lowing them to give defendants any punishment ranging from probation to
the maximum statutory sentence. 22 This lack of statutory or other type of
guidance resulted in enormous disparities and uncertainty in sentencing,
leading one prominent judge in the 1970s to express his disappointment
that, in our criminal justice system, a defendant's opportunity for liberty
arbitrarily depended upon "the variegated passions and prejudices of indi-
vidual judges. '23 Congress struggled with sentencing disparities for over a
decade before enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA),24 which
21. Since the arrival of administrative agencies, commissions and the overall approval of Con-
gress's delegation of its powers, the general standard for determining whether an enactment is a "law"
is not where it originated (i.e., the legislature) but rather whether it carries with it "the force of law."
See, e.g., Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 (1981) ("[lI]t is the effect, not the form, of the law that
determines whether it is ex post facto."); Watkins v. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Serv., 831
A.2d 1079, 1088 (Md. 2003) (noting that agency directives are not "laws" within the meaning of the Ex
Post Facto Clause because "although in the context of the ex post facto clause, the 'concept of a
"law" . . . is broader than a statute enacted by a legislative body, and may include some administrative
regulations' .... [i]f the provision 'does not have the force and effect of law' ... the ex post facto
clause does not apply.") (quoting Lomax v. Warden, Md. Corr. Training Ctr., 741 A.2d 476, 480 (Md.
1999)); Russell L. Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 109, 151-53
(1991) (courts generally refuse to apply the Ex Post Facto Clause to administrative interpretations, but
will bar their retroactive application if a lack of fair notice violates the Due Process Clause).
22. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION 1 (2007), http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.pdf.
23. Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Judge Frankel's
work served as a springboard for the federal sentencing reform era of the 1970s and 1980s, earning him
the title, "father of sentencing reform." Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sen-
tencing, in Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING 122 (Gene Healy
ed., 2004).
24. See generally Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364-66 (detailing the sentencing inadequacies and legisla-
tive history leading up to Congressional enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984); Kate Stith
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attempted to remedy the apparent deficiencies in the system by creating a
permanent commission charged with defining the national parameters of
federal sentences-thus severely restricting federal judges' previously
unlimited discretion. 2
5
The U.S. Sentencing Commission (the Commission), an independent
agency within the judicial branch, consists of seven voting members, all
appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate and committed to
serving six year terms. 26 Congress charged the Commission with promul-
gating the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines by establishing categories of of-
fenses and offender characteristics and devising appropriate sentence
ranges for each category.27 The Commission must review and revise the
Manual periodically and submit it to Congress for review. Absent explicit
Congressional modification or disapproval, the revisions go into effect
automatically 180 days after submission. 28 In 1987, the Commission
drafted the first version of the Guidelines Manual, which became effective
that same year due to congressional inaction.29
As a result of this sentencing reform, the discretion of courts was se-
verely limited in the sentencing stage; appellate courts closely scrutinized
any deviation from the Guidelines' ranges.30 The Sentencing Table in the
Guidelines Manual showed the relationship between the offense category
and offender characteristics; for each pairing of offense level and offender
characteristic category, the Table specified a sentencing range within which
a court should sentence a defendant. 31 Judges were provided with discre-
tion to depart from the applicable Guidelines range only if there was an
& Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993).
25. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 991(b)(l)(B), 98 Stat. 2017, 2018 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(l)(B) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)) (setting forth the Commission's purpose, including providing
"certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing dispari-
ties among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct
while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating
or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing prac-
tices .... ").
26. § 991(a), 98 Stat. at 2017; § 992(a), 98 Stat. at 2018.
27. § 994(c), 98 Stat. at 2020 (outlining factors to be considered in establishing offense catego-
ries); § 994(d), 98 Stat. at 2020 (outlining factors to be considered in establishing categories of defen-
dants).
28. § 994(o), 98 Star. at 2023.
29. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987) [hereinafter 1987 MANUAL].
30. In Koon v. United States, the Supreme Court instructed sentencing courts to determine what
took the case outside of the Guidelines' "heartland" and made it a special case and whether the Com-
mission had either encouraged or discouraged such departures. 518 U.S. 81, 95 (1996) (adopting United
States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)).
31. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I 1.1 (2006) (determination and use of range) and
§ 5A (Sentencing Table) [hereinafter 2006 MANUAL].
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''aggravating or mitigating circumstance" which the Commission did not
adequately consider in formulating the appropriate range 32 and were re-
quired to state on the record any reasons for departure. 33 Thus, although the
Manuals were labeled "Guidelines," they were in fact mandatory, providing
only limited discretion for sentencing judges. Deviations from the Guide-
lines rarely passed appellate review.
34
The Guidelines became law despite overwhelming criticism from the
judiciary. 35 Nearly 200 judges wrote opinions holding the system unconsti-
tutional within the first year.36 And although the Supreme Court validated
the constitutionality of the SRA and the Guidelines in an 8-1 decision,
37
judges continued to criticize the new sentencing scheme in all forums.
38
Nearly four years after the Guidelines went into effect, one D.C. Circuit
judge analogized the Guidelines to the emperor's new clothes, calling them
a "farce." 39 According to one commentator, the judges "spoke as though
the third branch had become the victim of a hostile takeover. '40 Despite
this strong opposition, the mandatory Guidelines remained in full force.
Although it seemed as if Congress had meticulously laid out all the
decisions to be made by judges during the sentencing of defendants, the
SRA did not explicitly tell the courts which version of the Manuals to use
when sentencing offenders. Because the Guidelines are revised rather fre-
quently, defendants often fall between conflicting Manuals: one in effect at
32. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 3553(b), 98 Stat. 1987, 1990 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
33. § 3553(c)(2), 98 Stat. at 1990 (requiring "specific reason" for any sentence imposed outside
the Guidelines range).
34. As has continued to be the case after Booker, see infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text,
above-Guideline sentence deviations were consistently affirmed, while below-Guideline deviations
were much more likely to be reversed.
35. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1719 (1992).
36. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1989, at 11 (1989).
37. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
38. Indeed, the displeasure with the judges' lack of discretion in sentencing continued long after
the Guidelines' enactment. E.g., Criticizing Sentencing Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 1990, at 22. See generally David Margolick, Justice by the Numbers: A Special Report; Full Spec-
trum of Judicial Critics Assail Prison Sentencing Guides, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at 1. For a come-
dic rendition, see Jon 0. Newman, Ode to the Guidelines, 9 FED. SENT'G REP. 338 (1997). Judge
Newman sang the following verse at a celebration of his 25 years on the bench (to the "School Days"
tune):
Guidelines, guidelines not so very wide lines. Enter a plea to a minor crime; you'll be amazed
at the extra time. And if a departure is what you seek, your 30-year sentence will drop by a
week. Guidelines, guidelines, narrow side-by-side lines. Relevant conduct is all that counts;
DEA agents will set the amounts. And if any jury should set you free, the guidelines will treat
you as if you're guil-tee! Guidelines, guidelines, those take-you-for-a-ride lines. Sentences
used to require minds and hearts; now all that you need are those guideline charts.
39. United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., concurring).
40. Freed, supra note 35, at 1720.
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the time of the crime and the other in effect at the time of the sentencing. 41
Were a sentencing judge to apply a newly enacted version of the Manual,
with an increased sentencing range, to a defendant who committed his or
her crime prior to that Manual's enactment, that application would be ret-
roactive because it applied a new punishment to an old crime. In the Senate
Report accompanying the SRA, Congress expressed its belief that retroac-
tively applying Guideline revisions in this way would not violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. 42 Nevertheless, the first Manual was devoid of any in-
struction to the courts regarding which version of the Manual to apply. 4
3
This gap in the sentencing scheme raised serious issues with the constitu-
tional prohibition on ex post facto laws.
B. History of the Ex Post Facto Clause's Application to the Guidelines
The United States Constitution expressly prohibits any ex post facto
law. 44 Although the Latin phrase "ex post facto" literally encompasses any
law passed "after the fact,"'45 courts have long recognized that the constitu-
tional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes that
disadvantage the offender affected by them. 46 When including this prohibi-
tion in the Constitution, the Framers intended it to be one of the "greater
securities to liberty and republicanism" by protecting against retroactive
application of penal laws.47 The Ex Post Facto Clause shields against this
"favourite and most formidable instrument[] of tyranny" 48 by curbing mali-
cious and retributive legislation and ensuring that citizens are given fair
41. As an example of a possible ex post facto violation, the Manual provides the following sce-
nario:
A defendant is convicted of an antitrust offense in November 1989. He is to be sentenced in
December 1992.... Under the 1992 edition of the Guidelines Manual (effective November 1,
1992), the defendant has a guideline range of 4-10 months .... Under the 1989 edition of the
Guidelines Manual (effective November 1, 1989), the defendant has a guideline range of 2-8
months ....
2006 MANUAL, supra note 31, § IBI. I I cmt. n.I. According to the Manual, in this situation a court
could determine that "application of the 1992 edition of the Guidelines Manual would violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause."
42. Id., § IBl.l l cmt. background (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 77-78 (1983), as reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3260-61).
43. 1987 MANUAL, supra note 29.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No ... ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
46. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-92 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 396 (opinion
of Paterson, J.); id. at 400 (opinion of Iredell, J.); see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429-32
(1987).
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 346 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. McLean 1787).
48. Id.
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notice of a law so they can rely on its directive and conform their con-
duct.4
9
In 1798, the Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull established four catego-
ries of ex post facto laws, including laws that increase the punishment of a
crime after it is committed.5 0 One of the earliest Supreme Court cases ex-
amining the retroactive application of sentencing laws came in 1937 with
Lindsey v. Washington, which struck down California's retroactive applica-
tion of an increase in the maximum statutory punishment for grand larceny
because "[t]he Constitution forbids the application of any new punitive
measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material dis-
advantage of the wrongdoer. ' 51 According to the Court, the length of the
sentence actually imposed was immaterial since the actual measure of pun-
ishment prescribed by the later statute was more severe than that of the
earlier. 52 This "measure of punishment" rule served as controlling prece-
dent when the Guidelines first made their appearance, effectively structur-
ing the measurement of punishments and altering those measurements
when revised.
With the sentencing reform era of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
establishment of both the U.S. Parole and U.S. Sentencing Commissions,
and the enactment of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, constitutional chal-
lenges flooded the courts. 53 In the midst of the sentencing debate, Justice
Marshall delineated modern ex post facto doctrine with the Supreme
Court's 1981 opinion in Weaver v. Graham. 54 Under Weaver, two critical
elements must be present for a penal law to be barred by the Ex Post Facto
Clause: (1) the law must apply to events that occurred before the law's
49. See Weaver. v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981); see also Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of
Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 471 (1982) ("The rule of law ... is a defeasible entitle-
ment of persons to have their behavior governed by rules publicly fixed in advance."). For a brief but
informative history of prohibiting retroactive legislation, along with the importance of doing so, see
Landgrafv. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 265-67 (1994).
50. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390-91 ("1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the
law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggra-
vates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punish-
ment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law re-
quired at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All these, and
similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive."); see also Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70
(1925) ("[A]ny statute.. . which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commis-
sion ... is prohibited as ex post facto.").
51. 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937).
52. Id.
53. Before the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines in Mistretta v. United
States, approximately 120 district judges upheld the Guidelines as constitutional and more than 200
district judges invalidated the Guidelines and all or part of the Sentencing Reform Act. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 36, at 11.
54. 450 U.S. at 28-31.
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enactment, and (2) the law must disadvantage the offender it affects. 55
Later, in California Department of Corrections v. Morales, the Court went
on to state that the inquiry for the second element is not whether the change
produces some "ambiguous sort of 'disadvantage,"' but "whether any such
change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by
which a crime is punishable. ' 56 While Weaver had incorporated a third
requirement (that the law's modification must be more than just a proce-
dural change), 57 the Court in Morales appeared to have melded these sec-
ond and third requirements into one by giving them both essentially the
same language.
As previously noted in Part I.A., Congress did not believe the
amended Guidelines would fall within the ex post facto prohibition when
originally enacting the SRA. 58 The Senate Judiciary Committee (the Com-
mittee), relying on the federal judiciary's practice of upholding retroactive
applications of the Parole Guidelines, 59 assumed the Ex Post Facto Clause
only applied to increases in statutory maximums.60 Since the Sentencing
Guidelines left the statutory maximums unaltered and were intended only
to structure discretion and not eliminate it, the Committee believed the
justifications for allowing the Parole Commission to retroactively apply
revised Parole Guidelines equally applied to the new Sentencing Guide-
lines. 61 In addition, the Committee reasoned that since the Guidelines were
intended to be "the most sophisticated statements available" regarding ap-
propriate sentencing practices, the application of "outmoded" Guidelines
would "foster irrationality and would be contrary to the goal of consistency
in sentencing. '62
Nevertheless, the original 1987 Manual did not include any explicit
instruction regarding which version of the Manuals to apply, nor did it
express any ex post facto concerns. 63 Despite this omission, the Supreme
Court never explicitly addressed whether the Guidelines fell within the
55. Id. at 29 (citing Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 401, and Calder, 3 U.S. at 390).
56. 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995).
57. 450 U.S. at 29 n.12 (a law is procedural if it does "not increase the punishment nor change the
ingredients of the offence or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt") (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574, 590 (1884)).
58. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 77-78 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3260-61.
59. Id. at 78 (citing Portley v. Grossman, 444 U.S. 1311 (1980); Warren v. U.S. Parole Commn'n,
659 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Zeidman v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 593 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1979); Rifai v.




62. Id. at 77.
63. 1987 MANUAL, supra note 28.
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prohibition on ex post facto laws. In Miller v. Florida, however, a case that
ultimately defined the issue, the Supreme Court relied on the Weaver test to
hold that Florida violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when retroactively ap-
plying its statutorily-revised state sentencing guidelines. 64 Florida urged the
Court to fall in line with the circuit courts' approach to the federal Parole
Guidelines (and the opinion of the Senate Judiciary Committee) by holding
that the state Sentencing Guidelines were merely procedural and thus out-
side the scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 65 The Court rejected Florida's
argument, outlining three characteristics that the Florida Sentencing Guide-
lines possessed, which the federal Parole Guidelines did not, that required
the Guidelines' inclusion within the Ex Post Facto Clause. 66 First, the Flor-
ida legislature enacted the revised sentencing law, giving it the force and
effect of law, as opposed to Parole Guidelines, which courts had consis-
tently held are not "laws" for the purposes of ex post facto analysis. 67 Sec-
ond, the Guidelines created a "high hurdle" that had to be cleared before a
court could exercise its discretion.68 Third, the revised Guidelines "directly
and adversely" affected the sentence a defendant received. 69
There is one notable difference between the Florida and federal sys-
tems-in Florida, the state legislature enacts the guidelines, whereas the
federal Guidelines become effective without any congressional action.
Nevertheless, nearly every circuit relied upon Miller when prohibiting fed-
eral courts from retroactively applying the federal Guidelines. 70 For exam-
ple, in United States v. Bell, the Eighth Circuit relied on Miller when
finding sufficiently "high hurdles preventing the court from departing"
from the Guidelines and thus holding that the federal Guidelines were in
64. 482 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1987).
65. Id. at 434.
66. Id. at 434-35. Although the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole for federal
crimes, the U.S. Parole Commission continues to promulgate guidelines for those sentenced for federal
crimes prior to November 1, 1987 and those sentenced for District of Columbia Code felony offenses
after August 5, 2000. PETER B. HOFFMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE
SYSTEM 1-2 (2003).
67. Miller, 482 U.S. at 434-35 (citing Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1553-54 (9th Cir.
1986)). In Wallace, the Ninth Circuit noted that just because Congress had "placed boundaries on the
[Parole] Commission's discretion," they did not "transform the Guidelines into law." 802 F.2d at 1553.
The Court cited the discretion of the Commission and the infrequency of compliance with the parole
guidelines as support for its finding. Id. at 1554.
68. Miller, 482 U.S. at 434-35.
69. Id.
70. See United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1385-86 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Bell,
991 F.2d 1445, 1447 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Morrow, 925 F.2d 779, 782-83 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nagi, 947 F.2d 211, 213 n.1
(6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith,
930 F.2d 1450, 1452 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1042 (1st Cir.
1990); United States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Worthy, 915
F.2d 1514, 1516 n.7 ( lIth Cir. 1990).
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fact "laws" within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 71 The Eighth
Circuit also found that because the Guidelines were binding on all federal
courts, they had been incorporated into the law, and Congress could not
"avoid the proscriptions of the ex post facto clause simply by delegating its
lawmaking function to a judicial agency and claiming the result is insulated
from the constitutional limitations on its legislative powers. '72
When the Commission finally did adopt an official position in 1992, it
expressed agreement with the Senate Judiciary Committee's original posi-
tion that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply to the Guidelines. 73 But by
that time, the circuit courts had already applied Miller to the Guidelines, 74
holding that their retroactive application did in fact violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause. In accordance with the circuits' prevailing opinion, the
Commission adopted the position that a sentencing court must use the
Guidelines Manual in effect at the time the defendant is sentenced unless it
determines that such a use would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, in
which case the court must use the Manual in effect on the date the defen-
dant committed the offense. 75 This provision continues to appear in the
Manual after Booker,76 though without much effect in those circuits relying
upon Booker's mandate to no longer find any retroactive applications in
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
II. SENTENCING PRACTICES AFTER UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
Until January of 2005, the federal Guidelines were mandatory, giving
them the force of law described in Miller.77 However, the sentencing land-
scape was dramatically altered with U.S. v. Booker, in which the Supreme
Court remedied Sixth Amendment conflicts with the Guidelines by excis-
ing their mandatory provisions. One year prior to Booker, the Court held
that, under the Sixth Amendment, judges can only base sentences on facts
reflected in a jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. 78 Thus, the Court
subsequently held in Booker that, because the Guidelines were mandatory
and required the judge to determine appropriate ranges by making his or
71. 991 F.2d 1445, 1451 (8th Cir. 1993).
72. Id. at 1449.
73. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.1 I cmt. background (1992) (citing S. Rep. No.
98-225, at 77-78 (1983) as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3260-61) [hereinafter 1992
MANUAL].
74. See cases cited supra note 70.
75. 1992 MANUAL, supra note 73, § IBl.11.
76. 2006MANUAL, supranote 31, § IBi1ll.
77. See supra note 69 for a list of circuits finding Miller applicable to the federal Guidelines.
78. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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her own factual findings, which may not have been reflected in a jury ver-
dict, sentencing under the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial. 79 The Court then proceeded to alter the SRA by excising
§ 3553(b)(1), the provision of the statute making the Guidelines manda-
tory,80 and § 3742(e), the appellate review section including, in particular,
de novo review of departures. 81 While the federal sentencing statute still
requires courts to "consider" Guideline ranges and "take them into account
when sentencing," 82 it also "permits" courts to "tailor the sentence in light
of other statutory concerns as well."'83
A. District Court Standard: "Sufficient, but not Greater than Necessary"
Under this new advisory system, sentencing courts must impose a sen-
tence that is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to achieve the pur-
poses of sentencing. 84 However, the post-Booker approach to sentencing is
quite similar to pre-Booker sentencing. 85 The circuits are in general agree-
ment that, even after Booker, the first step a sentencing judge must take in
determining a defendant's sentence is to calculate the appropriate Guideline
sentence. 86 In fact, if the trial judge incorrectly calculates the Guidelines
79. 543 U.S. 220, 230-44 (2005).
80. Id. at 259. The relevant text of the excised provision is as follows: "[T]he court shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the [Guideline] range .... In determining whether a circumstance was
adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004) (emphasis added).
81. 543U.S.at259.
82. Id. at 264.
83. Id. at 245-46.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2003). To do so, a court must consider, among other things:
(1) [T]he nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the de-
fendant;
(2) [T]he need for the sentence imposed--(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford ade-
quate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the de-
fendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) [T]he kinds of sentences available;
(4) [T]he kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-(A) the applicable cate-
gory of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guide-
lines ....
Id.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Booker... can be
expected to have a significant effect on sentencing in federal criminal cases, although perhaps not as
drastic an effect as some might suppose.").
86. United States v. Jim~nez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (Ist Cir. 2006); United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[A] district court shall first calculate ... the range prescribed by the
[G]uidelines."); United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The Supreme Court's
decision in Booker requires the sentencing judge first to compute the [G]uidelines sentence just as he
would have done before Booker .. "); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (1 1th Cir. 2005)
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range, the appellate court will usually remand the case before even consid-
ering whether the sentence otherwise qualifies as reasonable. 87
The difference post-Booker is that now sentencing courts must con-
sider not only the applicable Guideline ranges and policy statements in the
Guidelines Manual, but also all of the factors and policies set forth in 18
U.S.C § 3553(a).88 While federal appellate courts since Booker have gener-
ally required that the record reflect the sentencing judge's consideration of
the § 3553(a) factors, they have refused to require specific findings or even
reference to specific individual factors. 89 This is particularly true where the
sentence falls within the Guidelines range. More specifically, the sentenc-
ing court "must more thoroughly articulate its reasons when it imposes a
non-Guideline sentence than when it imposes a sentence under authority of
the Sentencing Guidelines." 90 In fact, "the farther a sentence departs from
the [G]uidelines sentence ... the more compelling the justification based
on factors in section 3553(a)" must be.91 In effect, although sentencing
courts must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors in reaching a sentence
"sufficient, but not greater than necessary, '92 the closer to the Guidelines
("First, the district court must consult the Guidelines and correctly calculate the range provided by the
Guidelines."). But cf United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1279 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We leave
open the question whether, and under what circumstances, district courts may find it unnecessary to
calculate the applicable Guidelines range.").
87. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hazelwood, 398
F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[R]egardless of whether the Guidelines are mandatory or merely advi-
sory, district courts are required by statute to consult them.., a district court's misinterpretation of the
Guidelines effectively means that it has not properly consulted the Guidelines ...."); United States v.
Skoczen, 405 F.3d 537, 549 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Even under an advisory regime, if a district court makes a
mistake in calculations under the Guidelines ... remand would be required just as before."); United
States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The duty to remand all sentences imposed as a
result of an incorrect application of the [G]uidelines exists independently of whether we would find the
resulting sentence reasonable ...."). But see Crosby, 397 F.3d at 112 ("In one circumstance ... precise
calculation of the applicable Guideline range may not be necessary .... [S]ituations may arise
where . . . the sentencing judge, having complied with section 3553(a), makes a decision to impose a
non-Guideline sentence ... ").
88. Seesupra note 84.
89. Compare United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Nor must a court
discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took
the factors into account in sentencing."), and United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th
Cir. 2006) (finding that where a sentence is within the Guidelines range and the defendant does not
raise any § 3553(a) contentions, courts are not required to explain on the record how the factors justify
the sentence), with United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[O]ur pre-
Booker requirement that district courts provide sufficient reasons to allow meaningful appellate review
of their discretionary sentencing decisions continues to apply in the post-Booker context."), and United
States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).
90. United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Mares, 402
F.3d 511,519 (5th Cir. 2005)).
91. Dean, 414 F.3d at 729.
92. See supra note 84.
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range a sentence falls, the more likely that sentence will pass appellate
"reasonableness" review.
B. Appellate Court Standard: "Reasonableness" Review
In addition to the mandatory requirement, Booker also excised
§ 3742(e), the SRA provision amended in 2003 to require de novo appellate
review of sentences. Prior to 2003, § 3742(e) directed appellate courts to
ensure sentences were reasonable, 9 3 which they proceeded to do by evalu-
ating sentences for abuse of discretion.94 The Booker remedial opinion
effectively invalidated the 2003 amendment when it excised § 3742 and
directed appellate courts to return to their familiar pre-2003 practice of
reviewing sentences under the "reasonableness" standard.95 As the Sixth
Circuit clarified, "a district court's job is not to impose a 'reasonable' sen-
tence. Rather, a district court's mandate is to impose a 'sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary'.. . . Reasonableness is the appellate stan-
dard of review in judging whether a district court has accomplished its
task."
96
When the Booker decision was initially handed down, its apparent re-
turn of judicial discretion was heralded, particularly by sentencing judges,
who described the new advisory system as "ideal," 9 7 "marvelous," 9 8 and "a
very positive thing because it puts the decisionmaking responsibility on the
person who is supposed to be making the decision, and that is the judge." 99
According to U.S. District Judge David 0. Carter, "[u]niformity under
the... [G]uidelines was a shield for defendants who deserved harsher sen-
tences and a sword that struck down rehabilitation for those who deserved
93. The relevant portion of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) enacted in 1984 and recodified in 2000 read in
part:
Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence ... (3)
is outside the applicable [G]uideline range, and is unreasonable, having regard for--(A) the
factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in chapter 227 of this title
[§§ 3551-3586]; and (B) the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by
the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or (4) was imposed for an of-
fense for which there is no applicable sentencing [G]uideline and is plainly unreasonable.
94. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996) ("The appellate court should not review the
departure de novo, but instead should ask whether the sentencing court abused its discretion.").
95. 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (in addition to other factors, "the past two decades of appellate
practice in cases involving departures, imply a practical standard of review already familiar to appellate
courts: review for 'unreasonableness."').
96. United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006).
97. Carle Hulse & Adam Liptak, New Fight Over Controlling Punishments is Widely Seen, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A29 (quoting former federal New York Judge John S. Martin, Jr., who resigned
in 2003 due to what he described as the unnecessarily "cruel and rigid" sentencing system).
98. Id. (quoting U.S. District Judge Jack B. Weinstein).
99. Alicia Caldwell, Sentencing Overruled, Justices: "'Mandatory Guidelines" Unconstitutional,
DENV. POST, Jan. 13, 2005, at A-01 (quoting U.S. District Judge John Kane).
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leniency. [Booker] lets the judge sentence fairly. Experience shows that
uniformity was a bad proxy for justice."' 00 Yet others condemned the
change as directly contrary to the express congressional intent to limit dis-
cretion and disparity in sentencing. Immediately after the Supreme Court
handed down Booker, republican Florida Representative Tom Feeney de-
scribed the decision as "fl[ying] in the face of the clear will of Congress"
by placing "extraordinary power to sentence a person solely in the hands of
a single federal judge-who is accountable to no one ... ."101
While the amount of discretion actually practiced or even allowed
post-Booker is still debated, Part III will illustrate that discretion in sen-
tencing has not come close to its pre-Guidelines prevalence. In fact, the
Guidelines' persistent influence and weight in sentencing decisions contin-
ues to place their revisions within the ex post facto prohibition.
III. RETROACTIVELY APPLYING FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AFTER UNITED STATES V. BOOKER CONTINUES TO VIOLATE THE Ex POST
FACTO CLAUSE
In order to determine whether the new advisory sentencing scheme
post-Booker should alter the Guidelines' placement within the ex post facto
prohibition, the role of the Guidelines must be analyzed under current ex
post facto doctrine as outlined in Part I.B. Subpart A will apply the Weaver
v. Graham two-pronged test to the current sentencing scheme. Subpart B
will evaluate the Guidelines' new role under the three Miller factors previ-
ously used by courts to ban retroactive application of revisions.
A. Weaver Analysis
Under current doctrine set forth in Weaver v. Graham, a law must be
both retrospective and disadvantageous to the offender to fall within the
scope of the Ex Post Facto Clause. According to Justice Marshall, the criti-
cal question in determining whether a law is retrospective is "whether the
law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective
date."1 02 When applied to revisions of the federal Guidelines, the answer to
this critical question, even post-Booker, is emphatically "yes." To begin
100. Henry Weinstein & David Rosenzweig, How Judges Will Use Discretion is the Big Question,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at A24 (quoting U.S. District Judge David 0. Carter).
101. Hulse & Liptak, supra note 97. Two years before Booker, Representative Feeney authored a
successful provision requiring the Attorney General to provide Congress with the names of federal
judges who sentenced below the Guidelines range for certain offenses. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No.
108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).
102. 450 U.S. 24, 31 (1980).
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with, in order to "consider" the Guidelines and "take them into account" a
district court judge must first calculate the Guideline range as outlined in
the Manual. 103 Therefore, the Guidelines still serve as the baseline number
from which courts determine sentences. If the applicable Guidelines ranges
present in the Manual that was in effect at the time the defendant commit-
ted the crime are altered in the revised Manual that is in effect at the time
of sentencing, that revision changes the legal consequences of the act com-
pleted before the revised Manual's effective date.
Although the "reasonableness review" of appellate courts gives the
appearance that sentencing courts have considerable discretion to deviate
from the Manual and seems to allow for the argument that the revision
would not necessarily change the sentence, a closer look at sentencing post-
Booker reveals that compliance with the Guidelines is still considerable. In
fact, six circuits have explicitly adopted a "presumption of reasonableness"
for any sentence falling within the appropriate Guideline range, 104 a prac-
tice recently upheld by the Supreme Court in Rita v. United States; 10 5
nearly all other circuits have recognized the increased likelihood that a
within-Guidelines sentence will be reasonable. 106 As a result of the con-
103. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87; see also Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches
About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137, 140 (2006), http://www.thepocket
part.org/2006/07/gertner.html.
104. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435
F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608
(7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2005).
105. 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007). The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on two reasonableness
cases in February of 2007. In both cases, Rita v. United States (Fourth Circuit) and United States v.
Claiborne (Eighth Circuit), the appellate courts recognized that their respective circuits had adopted a
presumption of reasonableness for within-Guideline sentences when reviewing the defendants' punish-
ments. In Rita, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the defendant's within-Guideline sentence; in Claiborne, the
Eighth Circuit reversed a below-Guideline sentence. The question presented to the Supreme Court was
whether a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences made the Guidelines effec-
tively mandatory and thus in violation of Booker. In Rita, the Supreme Court held that:
A nonbinding appellate presumption that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable does not require
the sentencing judge to impose that sentence. Still less does it forbid the sentencing judge
from imposing a sentence higher than the Guidelines provide for the jury-determined facts
standing alone.... Thus, our Sixth Amendment cases do not forbid appellate court use of the
presumption.
127 S. Ct. at 2466.
106. Four circuits have explicitly rejected a presumption of reasonableness, yet continue to ac-
knowledge that within-Guidelines sentences will typically be found reasonable. United States v. Jim&
nez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 516-18 (lst Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting with approval the district court's
decision to give "substantial weight" to the Guidelines); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27
(2d Cir. 2006) (Guidelines sentences will be reasonable "in the overwhelming majority of cases");
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that unvaried sentences are "more
likely to be reasonable"); United States v. Zavala, 443 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2006) (it is "very
likely" a Guideline calculation will fall "within the borders of reasonable sentencing territory"); see
also United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (1lth Cir. 2005) (not rejecting the reasonableness
presumption, but recognizing that within-range sentences will "ordinarily" be reasonable).
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tinuing strength of the Guidelines in sentencing decisions, the legal conse-
quences of a defendant's act can still be significantly altered by revisions in
the federal Guideline Manuals.
The second element requiring the retroactive application of the advi-
sory Guidelines to disadvantage the offender, and not merely be proce-
dural, is also fulfilled. After Morales, the focus of this ex post facto inquiry
is not on whether the revision produces some "ambiguous sort of 'disad-
vantage,' ... but on whether any such change alters the definition of crimi-
nal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable."' 107
The Supreme Court has defined procedural laws as those that do "not in-
crease the punishment, nor change the ingredients of the offence or the
ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt."'108
Even though a procedural change may work to the disadvantage of a
defendant, such a change is not ex post facto. For example, in Hopt v. Utah,
on the date of Hopt's alleged crime a convicted felon could not be called as
a witness. 109 Subsequent to that date, but prior to the trial of the case, the
law was changed, and a convicted felon was called to the stand and testi-
fied, implicating Hopt in the crime charged against him. 110 Even though
this change in the law obviously had a detrimental impact upon the defen-
dant, the Court found that the law was merely procedural and not ex post
facto: it neither made a previously innocent act criminal, nor aggravated a
crime previously committed, nor provided greater punishment, nor changed
the proof necessary to convict. 11
The Court examined this issue more recently in Dobbert v. Florida,
where a capital sentencing statute in effect when Dobbert committed mur-
der was held invalid before Dobbert was sentenced. 112 While the previous
statute prohibited a judge from overruling a jury's life imprisonment rec-
ommendation, 13 Dobbert was sentenced to death pursuant to the subse-
107. 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995).
108. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433 (1987) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884)).
109. 110 U.S. at 587-88 (Section 505 of Utah's Compiled Laws stated that "persons against whom
judgment has been rendered upon a conviction for a felony.. . shall not be witnesses.").
110. Id.
111. Id. at 589-90.
112. 432 U.S. 282, 288 (1977). In Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972), the Florida
Supreme Court held Florida's death penalty statutes to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's then-
recent decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), in which a Georgia death
penalty statute was held in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Florida legislature
enacted its new death penalty legislation the following year. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 288 (citing 1973 Fla.
Laws 72-724).
113. 432 U.S. at 288. The relevant provisions of the unconstitutional statutes provided that:
A defendant found guilty by a jury of an offense punishable by death shall be sentenced to
death unless the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a majority of the jury. When
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quently enacted statute, under which the district court judge was able to
(and in fact did) overrule the jury's recommendation of life imprison-
ment.114 Dobbert argued that application of the new sentencing law "de-
prived him of a substantial right to have a jury determine, without review
by the trial judge, whether [the death] penalty should be imposed" and thus
constituted an ex post facto violation." 5 Rejecting Dobbert's argument, the
Court concluded there was no ex post facto violation because the chal-
lenged provisions changed the procedural role of jury and judge in sentenc-
ing but did not add to the "quantum of punishment."' "16
The Guidelines have more than a procedural effect on sentences, even
after Booker; indeed, they continue to directly impact the punishments
defendants receive for their crimes. For circuits adopting a presumption of
reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences, 11 7 a change in the applica-
ble range in a subsequent Manual changes what sentence an appellate court
views as presumptively reasonable. Even in circuits that have refused to
adopt such a presumption, the courts have expressed the increased likeli-
hood that they will find those sentences reasonable-even accord them
"substantial weight." 18 Thus, unlike the statutes in both Hopt and Dobbert,
applying a revised Guideline Manual to a crime committed prior to its en-
actment "substantially alters the consequences attached to a crime already
completed, and therefore changes 'the quantum of punishment. '119 There-
fore, under Weaver and Morales, the retroactive application of even the
new "advisory" federal guidelines falls within the Constitutional prohibi-
tion of ex post facto laws.
B. Miller Analysis
As illustrated above, analysis of the new advisory guidelines under
Weaver and Morales places them within the scope of the ex post facto pro-
the verdict includes a recommendation to mercy by a majority of the jury, the court shall sen-
tence the defendant to life imprisonment.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (1971 & Supp. 1971-72).
114. 432 U.S. at 287-91.
115. Id. at 292.
116. Id. at 293-94.
117. See cases cited supra note 104.
118. Supra note 106. The high probability of increased circuits adopting reasonableness presump-
tions post-Rita must be noted here. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Demaree stated that appellate
courts were not "permitted" to presume that a Guidelines sentence was correct. 459 F.3d 791, 794
(2006). Since the Supreme Court has subsequently held that appellate courts are indeed permitted to
make those presumptions, it will be interesting to see what, if any, different approaches circuits begin to
adopt. At the time this article went to press, however, circuits have yet to hand down any significant
Rita decisions.
119. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 29, 33 (1981) (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94).
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hibition. This conclusion is further supported by looking at other rationales
relied upon by the courts in forbidding the retroactive application of the
Guideline revisions when they were mandatory. In Miller v. Florida, the
Court differentiated the mandatory state Sentencing Guidelines from the
federal Parole Guidelines, 120 which courts had always held outside the
prohibition's scope. 121 Because circuit courts initially used the Miller ra-
tionale to place the Guidelines within the ex post facto prohibition before
Booker, it would be beneficial to evaluate the new role of the Guidelines
after Booker under Miller as well.
The advisory Guidelines continue to fulfill all three Miller factors: (1)
they have retained the force and effect of law, (2) they impose a "high hur-
dle" before discretion can be exercised by sentencing judges, and (3) retro-
active application of their revisions "directly and adversely" affects the
sentence a defendant receives. First, the statutorily enacted state guidelines
at issue in Miller had the force and effect of law. 122 When the federal
Guidelines were mandatory pre-Booker, the federal courts consistently
recognized them as having the similar force and effect of law. 123 At first
glance, the now "advisory" status of the Guidelines seemingly pulls them
out of the ex post facto realm. However, a closer look at sentencing deci-
sions post-Booker show a peculiar likeness to pre-Booker compliance.
124
While Booker only requires sentencing courts to "consider" the Guidelines,
among the other § 3553(a) factors, the pattern emerging under circuit court
reasonableness review makes it clear that any post-Booker approach to
sentencing is still required to start with the appropriate Guideline ranges. 125
As was the practice pre-Booker, a sentence will be immediately remanded
if the court miscalculates the applicable range. 126 Although the Booker
opinion is void of any such mandate, nearly every circuit has adopted this
approach. 127 This judicially enforced requirement-that every sentencing
120. 482 U.S. 423,435-36 (1987).
121. See, e.g., Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1553 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing cases).
122. 482 U.S. at 435.
123. See supra note 70 for a list of circuits finding Miller applicable to the federal Guidelines.
124. For a comprehensive list of reasonableness review throughout the circuits for the first eighteen
months, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER
ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 30 (2006); Sentencing Law and Policy, Tracking Reasonableness Review
Outcomes. .. Final Update?, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2006/07/track
ing.reason.html (July 31, 2006, 23:59 EST). It is important to note that the Sentencing Law and Policy
Blog and the U.S. Sentencing Commission differ in the way they each categorize some of the same
cases.
125. See supra note 86.
126. See supra note 87.
127. Id.
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decision begin with a Guidelines calculation-ensures that the Guidelines
retain their force and effect of law.
Second, Florida's guidelines created a "high hurdle" before discretion
could be exercised. 128 In order to avoid Sixth Amendment implications,
Booker only requires appellate courts to determine whether a sentence is
unreasonable. However, as discussed in Part III.A., many circuits have
adopted a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guideline sentences-
a presumption recently held constitutional by the Supreme Court. 129 And
while there may be numerous circuit decisions affirming sentences that
deviated from the Guidelines, the vast majority of those are above-
Guideline sentences. 130 The New York Council of Defense Lawyers con-
ducted a survey of those cases between January 1, 2006 and November 16,
2006 where appellate courts undertook a reasonableness review.131 Of the
1,515 cases analyzed, 154 cases involved above-Guideline sentences and
only seven of those sentences were vacated. 132 In contrast, sixty of the
seventy-one cases involving below-Guideline sentences were vacated as
unreasonable.133 This study and others 34 illustrate that the "high hurdles"
judges face before they can impose discretion get even higher when they
exercise that discretion in favor of the defendant.
Third, retroactively applying the mandatory consideration of the
Guidelines "directly and adversely" affects the sentence the defendant re-
ceives. 135 The post-Booker data referenced above 136 strongly indicate that
defendants who are sentenced below the Guidelines are much more likely
to see their sentence reversed (and increased) on appeal than those defen-
dants who receive above-Guideline sentences. In fact, the Tenth Circuit
expressed similar concerns:
[B]elow [Gluidelines-range sentences are treated less deferentially by
appellate courts than above [G]uidelines-range sentences. According to
128. Miller, 482 U.S. at 435.
129. See cases cited supra note 104. Nearly all others have recognized the likelihood of within-
Guidelines sentences being reasonable. See cases cited supra note 106.
130. See infra notes 131 and 134 and text accompanying notes 136-37. See also, e.g., United States
v. Larrabee, 436 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming sentence 54% above Guidelines range be-
cause the sentencing judge took into account § 3553(a)); United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d 483, 491-92
(5th Cir. 2005) (affirming sentence seventy-nine months, or 300%, above the Guidelines range because
the seriousness of the offense was underrepresented by the criminal history category).
131. N.Y. COUNCIL OF DEF. LAWYERS, REASONABLENESS REVIEW DATABASE (2006),
http://www.nycdl.org/itemcontentibooker/NYCDL-reasonablenessreview. PDF.
132. Id. at 2a.
133. Id.
134. E.g., OFFICE OF DEFENDER SERV. TRAINING BRANCH, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
COURT OF APPEALS REVIEW 2 (2007), http://www.fd.org/CourtofAppealsReviewl 2.1.05-I 1.30.06.pdf.
135. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,435 (1987).
136. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
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the United States Sentencing Commission, nearly three times as many
below [G]uidelines-range sentences have been reversed for unreason-
ableness as have been affirmed as reasonable. In contrast, the same re-
port states that close to seven times as many above [G]uidelines-range
sentences have been found reasonable than have been found unreason-
able.
13 7
It follows that appellate courts are more likely to allow sentences that
are not controlled by the Guidelines when those sentences are harsher than
what the Guidelines range calls for. Conversely, it is the defendants whom
sentencing judges believe deserve a lower-than-Guidelines sentence that
are more strictly controlled by the Guidelines' ranges. Perversely, it is
those defendants whom sentencing judges believe deserve leniency that are
more likely to be adversely affected when the Guidelines' ranges are in-
creased.
While it is true that not every defendant in every case will be indi-
vidually harmed by receiving a longer sentence, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that a party claiming an ex post facto violation does not
have the burden of showing that he would have received a lesser punish-
ment under the previous statute. 138 Instead, the defendant must establish
that "the measure of punishment itself has changed."']39 Because the Guide-
lines continue to be the starting point for all sentence determinations, 140 a
revision in the Guidelines changes the measure of punishment. Whereas
procedural changes, such as the frequency of parole reviews1 41 or the roles
of the judge and jury, 14 2 leave the crime or punishment unaffected, retroac-
tively applying the Guideline revisions directly and adversely affects the
punishment the defendant receives, even after Booker, because such revi-
sions alter "the measure of punishment itself."
The analyses under both Miller and Weaver illustrate how the retroac-
tive application of Guidelines revisions after Booker continues to violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Weaver mandates the inclusion of the advisory
Guidelines in the ex post facto prohibition because their revisions (1) alter
the legal consequences of acts completed after their effective date, and (2)
disadvantage offenders by altering the "quantum of punishment" applied in
their cases. Miller further supports the Guidelines' continuing inclusion
because (1) they have retained the force and effect of law, (2) they impose
137. United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 595 n.5 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, supra note 124, at 30).
138. Cal. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510 n.6 (1995) (citing Lindsey v. Washington,
301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937)).
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 86 and 87 and accompanying text.
141. Garnerv. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249-56 (2000).
142. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292-94 (1977).
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a high hurdle before sentencing judges can impose discretion, and (3) the
retroactive application of their revisions directly and adversely affects the
punishment the defendant receives. Nevertheless, the issue initially appears
to be splitting the federal circuits.
IV. CURRENT CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT OPINION
The Seventh Circuit drew the first hard line on the status of applying
the ex post facto prohibition to revised Manuals after Booker. In United
States v. Roche, the Seventh Circuit noted that Booker removed the Miller
foundation upon which circuits had relied when placing the Guidelines
within the ex post facto prohibition. 143 In United States v. Demaree, the
Seventh Circuit went on to explicitly hold that, after Booker, applying re-
vised Guideline Manuals to defendants who committed their crimes before
the Manuals were enacted no longer violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
144
In Demaree, the defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud and tax offenses.
145
Under the 2000 Manual, which was effective at the time of the offenses, the
sentencing range for Demaree's offenses was eighteen to twenty-four
months. 146 Under the 2004 Manual, which was effective at the time of sen-
tencing and which the judge used to determine Demaree's sentence, the
applicable sentencing range was twenty-seven to thirty-three months.
147
The judge sentenced Demaree to thirty months, but noted that he would
have only imposed a sentence of twenty-seven months had the 2000 Man-
ual applied-"above the Guidelines range, but not quite so far above as the
[thirty] month sentence that he actually gave her." 148 Demaree appealed,
claiming the Government's use of the 2004 Manual violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause and that she was thereby injured by receiving a longer sen-
tence than she would have received under the 2000 Manual. 1
49
The Seventh Circuit, while noting that the purpose of the ex post facto
prohibition "is not to enable criminals to calculate with precision the pun-
ishments that might be imposed on them," 150 rejected Demaree's argument
143. 415 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2005).
144. 459 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2006) ("We conclude that the ex post facto clause should apply
only to laws and regulations that bind rather than advise, a principle well established with reference to
parole guidelines whose retroactive application is challenged under the ex post facto clause."). Demaree
was followed in United States v. Zimmer, 199 F. App'x 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2006), which advised lower
court to apply Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing on remand.
145. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 792.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 792-93.




that the presumption of reasonableness given to the Guidelines presump-
tively alters the sentence a defendant receives and thus keeps the Guide-
lines within the Ex Post Facto Clause's reach. 151 The court reasoned that
sentencing judges are "not required-or indeed permitted" to presume that
a sentence within the Guidelines' range is correct-all they are obligated to
do is "consider" the Guidelines along with § 3553(a) factors. 152 Notably,
the court relied on the proposition that "[t]he applicable [G]uideline nudges
[the sentencing judge] toward the sentencing range, but his freedom to
impose a reasonable sentence outside the range is unfettered."' 153
In United States v. Barton, which the Seventh Circuit cited as support
in Demaree, the Sixth Circuit also found that the now-advisory nature of
the Guidelines required a new stance on applying ex post facto doctrine to
the revised Manuals. 154 The court referred to the Guidelines as "recom-
mendations" and emphasized that there was no guarantee that the Guide-
lines' ranges would have any "critical effect" on a defendant's sentence. 155
According to the Sixth Circuit:
When the Guidelines were mandatory, defendants faced the very real
prospect of enhanced sentences caused by changes in the Guidelines or
changes in the interpretation of the Guidelines that occurred after they
had committed their crimes. Now that the Guidelines are advisory, the
Guidelines calculation provides no such guarantee of an increased sen-
tence, which means that the Guidelines are no longer akin to statutes in
their authoritativeness. As such, the Ex Post Facto Clause itself is not
implicated. 156
Yet not all courts have been as willing to retreat from pre-Booker
precedent. Following Booker, the First Circuit, while not specifically ad-
dressing the issue, reiterated the same pre-Booker ex post facto concerns in
United States v. Cruzado-Laureano: "The Constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws... requires that a defendant be sentenced under
the [G]uidelines in effect when he committed the offense, rather than those
in effect at time of sentencing, where subsequent amendments would have
increased his punishment."' 157 In addition, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
151. Id. at 794.
152. Id. at 794-95 (citing United States v. Brown, 450 F.3d 76, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2006)).
153. Id. at 795. The Court based this conclusion on the premise that the district court's sentence is
subject to "only light review." Id.
154. 455 F.3d 649, 655 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006).
155. Id. at 654.
156. Id. at 655 n.4.
157. 404 F.3d 470, 488 n.10 (1st Cir. 2005).
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district court's refusal to apply the revised Manual due to ex post facto
concerns. 
158
Because these ex post facto issues are not especially prominent on the
circuit court level as of yet, the district courts are grappling with the ques-
tion of which version of the Manuals to apply-and they do so with virtu-
ally no guidance. The District Court of Maine noted that "after Booker
made the Guidelines advisory, the underpinning for the ex post facto con-
cern, namely, that changes in the mandatory Guidelines were 'the equiva-
lent of statutory changes,' has no longer been as clear."' 159 While indicating
a need for more guidance from the First Circuit, the District Court relied on
Cruzado-Laureano and applied the Manual in effect at the time of the
crime. 160 When discussing the same issue, the District Court of Massachu-
setts acknowledged what the Seventh Circuit in Demaree refused to ac-
knowledge-that after Booker, the Guidelines still are not "truly advisory"
because, even without a presumption of reasonableness, the sentencing
court is required under First Circuit precedent to give "substantial weight to
the Guidelines" and "may not question even the unexplained policy choices
of the Sentencing Commission."' 16 1 However, the District Court instead
relied on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to apply the version of the
Manual in force at the time of the defendant's offense and not at the time of
his sentencing. 162
When allowing retroactive application of increased Guideline ranges,
neither the Seventh nor Sixth Circuit applied or even acknowledged the ex
post facto doctrine established under Weaver and Miller. As a result, the
Supreme Court's attempt in Booker to make sentencing comply with Sixth
Amendment requirements has led the constitutionality of sentencing to
depend on the circuit in which a defendant lives. This imposition of a geo-
graphical bias on the right to due process is a completely at odds with the
congressional desire for sentencing conformity when initially enacting the
SRA. Accordingly, circuits, and perhaps even the Supreme Court, must
address the persisting ex post facto concerns raised by the advisory Guide-
line system before the gap between approaches widens.
158. United States v. Andres, 178 F. App'x 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The sentencing took place
after [Booker], and the district court clearly indicated that it knew the Guidelines were 'advisory.'
Because the district court determined that use of the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing might
implicate the ex post facto clause, it properly followed U.S.S.G. § IBI.1 l(b)(l) and applied the version
in effect 'on the last day of the offense of conviction."').
159. United States v. Kingsbury, No. CR-05-51-B-W, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62779, at *5 (D. Me.
Sept. 1, 2006).
160. Id. at *7-8.
161. United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 335 (D. Mass. 2006) (citations omitted).
162. Id.
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V. THE GUIDELINES MAINTAIN THE FORCE OF LAW AND SHOULD
RETAIN PLACEMENT WITHIN THE Ex POST FACTO PROHIBITION
The debate over ex post facto's reach after Booker appears to center
around one issue: whether or not the Guidelines still retain the force of law,
or statutory authoritativeness. After seeing the circuits' differing views on
how much authority the Guidelines actually possess, it is easy to under-
stand why circuits cannot agree on how to apply the Ex Post Facto Clause.
While different levels of deference, or authority, accorded the Guidelines
have emerged after Booker, an examination of the two most extreme views
will clearly illustrate why the Guidelines retain their placement within the
ex post facto prohibition. Level One, the heaviest weight, includes those
circuits that have adopted a presumption of reasonableness for within-
Guideline sentences. Level Two, providing the least amount of weight to
the Guidelines, makes the Guidelines an equal among the other § 3553(a)
factors. The strength of support for the continuing application of the Ex
Post Facto Clause to Guideline revisions appears to weaken in proportion
to the applicable level of deference accorded the Guidelines by the courts.
However, regardless of the Guidelines' strength, any level of deference still
demands compliance with the ex post facto prohibition.
Level One provides the strongest argument for the Ex Post Facto
Clause's continuing application, because it encompasses the situations that
are most similar to pre-Booker practices. In dissent to the remedial portion
of the Booker opinion (excising the mandatory provisions of the Guide-
lines), Justice Scalia expressed serious concerns over the resulting standard
of reasonableness review. 163 According to Scalia, appellate courts faced
with the "daunting prospect" of evaluating each individual sentence for
reasonableness "might seek refuge in the familiar and continue the 'appel-
late sentencing practice during the last two decades." ' 164 Scalia rather accu-
rately predicated exactly what has happened-that appellate courts would
use the "reasonableness" language while reverting to their pre-Booker sen-
tencing habits of affirming within-Guideline range sentences, and vacating
and remanding those falling outside Guideline ranges (and below-range
sentences, in particular). 165 According to Scalia, "any system which [holds]
it per se unreasonable (and hence reversible) for a sentencing judge to re-
ject the Guidelines is indistinguishable from the mandatory Guidelines
system that the Court ... holds unconstitutional."' 166 Yet a little over two
163. 543 U.S. 220, 303-13 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 312 (citing id. at 262 (majority opinion)).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 124-37.
166. 543 U.S. at 311 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol 83:1
2008] RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 421
years later, the Supreme Court upheld the presumption of reasonableness
for within-Guideline sentences against Sixth Amendment attacks in the
wake of Booker. Thus, although appellate courts have not in fact adopted a
per se rule of reasonableness, given current trends and the Supreme Court's
nod of approval, they might as well have adopted Scalia's hypothetical
system.
The Seventh Circuit, having already adopted a presumption of reason-
ableness and drawn itself closer to Scalia's prediction than some other cir-
cuits, proceeded in Demaree to deny the Ex Post Facto Clause's application
to Guidelines revisions. The Demaree decision is confusing because the
argument for the Ex Post Facto Clause's application after Booker is strong-
est in the circuits that have adopted a presumption of reasonableness. Ac-
cording to the Seventh Circuit in Demaree (a decision preceding the
Supreme Court's opinion in Rita), courts are not "permitted... to 'pre-
sume' that a sentence within the [G]uidelines range is the correct sen-
tence .... ,,167 However, that is exactly what the Seventh and other similar
circuits have allowed sentencing courts to do by adopting a presumption of
reasonableness in favor of within-Guideline sentences. The Demaree court
went on to assert that while the Guideline ranges may "nudge" the sentenc-
ing judge's decision, the judge's ability to give a sentence outside the range
is "unfettered," as long as it is reasonable. 168 The Demaree reasoning,
while pragmatic, is unrealistic. The data clearly shows that the discretion of
sentencing judges is anything but "unfettered." Even the Demaree court
acknowledged the high Guidelines compliance since Booker when it noted
that "[m]ost federal sentences..,. continue after Booker to be within the
[G]uidelines' sentencing ranges.'169 Accordingly, the Seventh and other
circuits falling within Level One must be wary of the Demaree and Roche
precedents and acknowledge the actual continuing strength of the Guide-
lines in future ex post facto challenges.
Even Level Two weight demands adherence to the ex post facto pro-
hibition. Despite its holding, the Demaree court acknowledged that a literal
interpretation of the current ex post facto test under Weaver, asking
whether the defendant is disadvantaged as a result of a retroactively applied
law, "would encompass a change in even voluntary sentencing guidelines,
for official guidelines even if purely advisory are bound to influence
judges' sentencing decisions."'1 70 In other words, continuing to apply the
167. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d. 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Brown,
450 F.3d 76, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2006)).
168. Id. at 795.
169. Id. at 794.
170. Id. at 794.
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Ex Post Facto Clause is consistent with Booker's mandate that guidelines
be "advisory"--there are still statutory and judicial directives for courts to
consider the Guidelines in formulating a sentence, even if they are not
given presumptively reasonable treatment on appellate review. Thus, these
legal requirements clearly are "laws" within the ex post facto prohibition,
making the requirement to consider the Guidelines law and placing it
squarely within the Clause's scope.
To date, no circuit has recognized the other § 3553(a) factors as hav-
ing the same importance as the Guidelines. Douglas Berman, Professor at
the Moritz College of Law and author of the Sentencing Law and Policy
Web Blog, asserts that this is the central flaw of reasonableness review-
the failure of sentencing court's to phrase "reasonableness" in terms of
§ 3553(a) factors and not in terms of the Guidelines. 171 According to Ber-
man, the Guidelines are just "one factor among many-and not the first or
most important one." 172 Therefore, the Supreme Court should have cor-
rected the current trend in appellate courts by "clarifying that reasonable-
ness review must be informed, as the Court said in Booker, by the
'numerous factors' of [§] 3553(a) and not just the [G]uidelines."'1 73
Contrary to Professor Berman's wishes, with the current state of rea-
sonableness review under Rita,174 the Guidelines remain the first and most
important factor in sentencing. Consequently, and contrary to the rulings in
Demaree and Barton, retroactive application of the Guidelines is clearly
barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause. And while the varying approaches
taken by the circuits post-Booker may differ now and in the future regard-
ing the amount of weight they each accord the Guidelines, their mandate to
consider the Guidelines will surely be left unaltered.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the U.S. Constitution wrote from experience. They had
known tyranny and they appreciated the importance of every assurance of
personal liberty that they included in the country's founding document.
Retroactive legislation had been a favorite form of retributive and vindic-
171. Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2006/
08/the centralcir.html (Aug. 22, 2006, 08:57 EST).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2467-68 (2007) ("[W]e believe that, where judge and Commission both
determine that the Guidelines sentences is an appropriate sentence for the case at hand, that sentence
likely reflects the § 3553(a) factors (including its 'not greater than necessary' requirement). This cir-
cumstance alleviates any serious general conflict between § 3553(a) and the Guidelines, for the pur-
poses of appellate review. And, for that reason, we find that nothing in § 3553(a) renders use of the
presumption unlawful.") (citations omitted).
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tive governmental action by the English Crown.175 The prohibition against
ex post facto laws, crucial to the drafters, was not included by chance-its
assurance was of supreme importance. As one legal commentator noted
over one hundred years after the founding, "[l]aws of this kind are so at
variance with the general idea of legislative power, that, even in the ab-
sence of a constitutional prohibition, it may fairly be doubted whether they
would be tolerated by the courts in this country."176 So it is impossible to
conceive how, even with such a steadfast constitutional guarantee against
ex post facto laws, federal circuits have begun to shrink from such an
imbedded principle of our limited government and indeed tolerate actions
"so at variance" with that principle.
With the current reasonableness pattern, including the presumptions in
favor of within-Guideline sentences and the substantial weight given to the
Guidelines, courts must continue to hold the retroactive application of fed-
eral Guideline revisions forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause. This result
is consistent with Booker's mandate that guidelines be "advisory," because
there are still statutory and judicial directives for courts to consider the
Guidelines, even if not presumptively reasonable, in formulating a sen-
tence. These directives, or mandates, are clearly "laws" within the ex post
facto prohibition, making the requirement to consider the Guidelines a law;
thus, this requirement falls squarely within the Clause's scope. Congress
cannot insulate itself from constitutional limitations on its authority by
delegating that authority to an administrative or judicial agency. Federal
courts must not allow such a dangerous wolf to dress in sheep's clothing.
175. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798) (listing several historical instances to illustrate
the Founders' rationale behind the prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws). This is
further evidenced by the inclusion of the same prohibitions in many state Constitutions. By the time of
the Calder decision in 1798, the states of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North
Carolina and South Carolina all had ex post facto prohibitions. Id.
176. WADE, supra note 1, § 270.

